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Abstract: The aim of this article is to assess the empirical evidence of the nexus 
between public expenditure and inflation for the Mediterranean countries during 
the period 1970-2009, using a time-series approach. After a brief introduction, a 
concise survey of the economic literature on this issue is shown, before discussing the 
data and introducing some econometric techniques. Stationarity tests reveal, 
generally, that public expenditure/GDP ratio is a I(1) process, while prices index 
is a I(2) process. Moreover, we find a long-run relationship between the growth of 
public expenditure and inflation only for Portugal. Furthermore, Granger 
causality tests results show a short-run evidence of a directional flow from 
expenditure to inflation for Cyprus, Malta and Spain; of a bidirectional flow for 
Italy; and from inflation to public expenditure for France. Some notes on the 
policy implications of our empirical results conclude the paper. 
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1. – Introduction 
The optimal size of public sector is one of the most appealing topic in fiscal 
policy and public finance studies. Several theories have been advanced to 
explain this problem in different countries. Among them we find Wagner’s 
Law (1912) of increasing state activities, Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis 
(1961), critical-limit hypothesis (Clark (1945; 1964)), Leviathan hypothesis 
(Brennan and Buchanan (1980)), differential productivity hypothesis 
(Baumol (1967)), and the relative price hypothesis (Balassa (1964); 
Samuelson (1964)). So, economic literature identified several determinants 
of public expenditure growth: inflation (Clark (1933; 1937; 1945; 1964)), 
total revenue (De Viti De Marco (1893; 1898; 1934); Dalena and Magazzino 
(2010)), debt service or burden ratio (Ricardo (1817); Barro (1974; 1989); 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)), GDP growth rate (Barro (1989; 1990); Scully 
(1994); Armey (1995); Forte and Magazzino (2010); Magazzino (2008; 
2009b; 2010a; 2010b)), strategic transfers from federal government to the 
state governments, population growth, urbanization effect (Wagner (1912)), 
and taxation. 
Over the past three decades, some studies – using the concepts of 
cointegration and Granger causality – focused on several countries and time 
periods. Yet, empirical findings are mixed and, for some countries, 
controversial. The results differ even on the direction of causality and the 
short-term versus long-term effects on economic policies. Depending upon 
what kind of causal relationship exists, its policy implications may be 
significant. 
The aim of our study is to analyze the nexus between public expenditure 
and prices for the Mediterranean countries in the period 1970-2009. The 
data used in this work were taken from the IMF Government Finance Statistics 
database. 
In addition, Italy has a high public debt to GDP ratio and a high share of 
public expenditure; so, the reduction in public expenditure could represent 
a valid way for the consolidation of public finances. However, reducing the 
size of public sector should focus on the expenditure items that have less 
impact on GDP. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of 
economic literature on this issue. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
applied empirical methodology and a brief discussion of the data used. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents our 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. – Literature Survey 
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Already Ricardo (1824) stressed the importance of separation of the central 
bank from political institutions, and the prohibition of monetary financing 
by the excesses of government spending (deficit monetization), only to 
clearly enunciate the key principles of the theory of today’ central bank 
independence from political power. 
The Australian statistical C. Clark (1933, 1937, 1945, 1964) warned the 
most economically advanced countries of the danger of letting go beyond 
the relationship between public expenditure and national income as the 
threshold value of 25%. Clark lays down that when government tax 
proceeds reach this critical ratio, a progressive tax system generates 
increasing proportions of additional income from taxpayers, whose 
productivity falls. In fact, high levels of taxation would have reduced 
incentives to work and saving. Moreover, people become less resistant to 
the inflationary methods of government financing. 
According to the analysis of Clark, the higher taxes would have 
decreased the profits of enterprises, which, passing it on to prices, have 
increased the prices of final goods. So, the overall effect is a fall of the 
aggregate supply (due to the falls of private incentives) and an expansion of 
the aggregate demand (due to the inflationary financing techniques) and, 
hence, inflation results. 
Through an analysis of time series on prices, taxes and public spending 
of a large group of countries for the inter-War period, Clark came precisely 
the threshold of 25% as a ratio of public expenditure on national income. If 
it is true that inflation is a “social evil”, it is true that inflation reduces the 
costs of the public sector, since certain groups in society cannot defend. 
Moreover, the fiscal drag – the crop that inflation gives policy-makers in 
countries with progressive tax systems of type – is disappearing in many 
states, since the awareness of citizens in this respect has increased in recent 
years. Yet, recent decades have, however, proved that many countries have 
crossed the 25% limit without much inflationary tendencies (Jain (1989)). 
Already Bernstein (1936) had investigated the possibility of using the 
public know which specific anti-recession tool, highlighting the effects of 
inflation. According to the scholar, in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century great attention was given to possible use of public 
expenditure in order to minimize cyclical fluctuations on employment and 
production (emphasized by the report of the “Royal Commission on the 
Poor Laws”), while others economists – as Keynes, Martin, Foster, 
Catchings and Pigou – had suggested the use of public spending as an 
instrument of economic policy, whereas periods of depression as a stage 
characterized by a low cost. Bernstein came to the conclusion that if these 
conditions were not favorable, considerable increases in public spending 
during periods of economic depression would lead to increased prices and 
production. 
Bullock (1934), about the crisis of the thirties, put it on the rise-to the 
effects of economic policy choices of the Administration status, stressing 
the inadequacy and the lateness of the spending policies enacted in the years 
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1933-1934, also in view of the level of prices and sharp decline in tax 
revenue. Basically, if the start conditions of monetary stability are preserved, 
then the government will have ample room in the policies of deficit. 
Pechman and Mayer (1952) discussed the limits to the inflation taxation 
outlined by Clark, concluding that in the period between the two world 
wars, the empirical evidence supports the thesis Clark in only two cases 
(Britain and Norway). Similarly, the price indices calculated for the period 
1945-1948 grew annually in 53 of the 71 countries considered here: Clark 
arguments do not prove that prices grew faster where the tax burden 
exceeded the limit set by him. 
Eltis (1983), analyzing the causes of the difficulties of the British 
economy in the seventies, found a double bond between inflation and 
public spending on the one hand, inflation was seen as the effect of deficit 
policies, useful - through increases supply of money - to finance the excess 
expenditure. Secondly it was originated by the wage increases put forward 
by workers to protect their purchasing power. Eltis found a strong empirical 
evidence to support the view that robust budget deficits inflationary 
pressures. 
Tanzi, Blejer and Teijeiro (1987) moved from the consideration that the 
different parts of the public budget respond differently to inflationary 
pressures. However, scientists spotted in public debt service a strong link 
between public spending and the price trend. 
Buiter (1987) studies the consequences for inflation of public 
expenditure cuts, emphasizing the important distinction between cuts in 
public consumption expenditure (which will tend to reduce the deficit) and 
cuts in public sector capital formation (which may have the perverse effect 
of increasing the deficit). This will happen if the expenditure effect is 
swamped by the direct and indirect effects of a reduced public sector capital 
stock on government revenues. If the public sector deficit increased, the 
cuts in public sector capital formation will raise the demand for seigniorage 
revenue. 
Özatay (1997) studying the Turkish experience in the period 1997-1995 
emphasizes the importance of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
in achieving price stability. Results indicate that, despite the rapidly changing 
financial environment, there are stationary long-run money-income 
relationships. Moreover, the growth rates of various monetary aggregates 
have predictive power for future movements in the Consumer Price Index. 
However, as the Turkish case clarifies, in an economy with persistent 
budget deficits these properties are not sufficient to conduct successful 
monetary policies. By a credible policy, it is possible to substantially reduce 
the inflation rate from 85% to 10% in a 4-year period. Yet, this necessitates 
that the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement should not exceed 1.5% of 
GNP. 
Ruge-Murcia (1999) develops a dynamic, rational expectations model of 
inflation where the money supply is endogenously determined by the 
government’s use of newly created money to finance its current spending 
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and by the effect of past rates of inflation on the real value of taxes. In an 
empirical application to Brazil (1980-1989, monthly data), estimates indicate 
that there are steady-state inflation and money growth rates associated with 
each of the two possible government spending regimes. The low regime 
would be characterized in equilibrium by rates of inflation and money 
growth of 8.22% and 7.29% per month, respectively, and a share of GDP 
devoted to government outlays of 22.73%. The high spending regime would 
be associated with an expenditure level amounting to 33.43% of GDP, a 
monthly rate of inflation of 19.12%, and a monthly money growth rate of 
19.25%. 
Aizenman and Hausmann (2000), investigate budgetary rules for an 
economy characterized by inflation and volatile relative prices. In the 
absence of shocks, the design of the budget is that the Treasury allocates 
funds once in every budgetary cycle. In the presence of volatile shocks, one 
would observe occasional budgetary revisions, the outcome of which is that 
the actual expenditure differs from the projected one. They use a panel data 
for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Caribbean, Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, for 1970-1994. The 
correlation between the budget error and the inflation variable turned out to 
be high, and highly significant. Similar results are found for the case where 
inflation is decomposed into the expected and the unexpected components, 
confirming that both the expected and the unexpected inflation increase the 
budget error. 
Alavirad (2003) studies the effect of inflation on government revenue 
and expenditure for Islamic Republic of Iran. His major finding is that the 
government budget deficit increases in the inflationary condition. In 
addition, the deficit increases money supply, and this tends to increase 
inflation in Iran. 
Ezirim and Muoghalu (2006), starting from Clark’s hypothesis, found 
that when the size of the public sector (measured by the share of 
expenditure on GDP) exceed a certain threshold, incentives to produce are 
discouraged (because of high tax burden). The reduction in aggregate 
supply, in addition, is even more pronounced in the case of budget balance 
(viewed as a fiscal constraint). The net result of such a bad adjustment 
between demand and supply is an inflationary spiral. 
Kia (2006), studying Iranian economy for the period 1970-2002, focuses 
on internal and external factors, which influence the inflation rate in 
developing countries. According to the estimation results, over the long run, 
a higher exchange rate leads to a higher price in Iran. So, a policy regime 
that leads to a stronger currency can help to lower inflation. However, a 
higher money supply when it is anticipated does not lead to a higher price 
level, but an unanticipated shock in the money supply results in a 
permanent rise in the price level. So, an unanticipated reduction in the 
money supply should be a powerful tool to reduce inflation in Iran. It is 
also found that the fiscal policy is very effective in Iran to fight inflation as 
the increase in the real government expenditures as well as deficits cause 
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inflation, but if the changes are unanticipated they cause the opposite effect. 
While a high debt per GDP is deflationary. 
Ezirim, Muoghalu and Elike (2008) studied the relationship between 
growth rate of public spending and inflation rate for the United States of 
America in the period 1970-2002 found that the two variables move in the 
same direction. According to their analysis, inflation affects spending 
decisions of the U.S. federal government, but is in turn influenced both the 
short and long term. The dual causality was confirmed, however, the 
conclusions were reached and Ezirim and Ofurum (2003). The conclusion 
drawn by these scholars is that, in order to bend inflation, governments 
should appropriately reduce the levels of expenditure, on the other hand, to 
reduce the growth in the size of the public, policy-makers should diminish 
price dynamics. A further consequence would be that fiscal policy would be 
a valuable tool for controlling inflation, by virtue of their ability to act 
directly on public spending (content). 
Pekarski (2010) analyzes budget deficits and inflation in high inflation 
economies. The main finding is that recurrent outbursts of extreme 
inflation in these economies can be explicitly explained by the hysteresis 
effect associated with the action of two mechanisms: the arithmetic of the 
wrong side of the ITLC and the Patinkin effect. Another finding is that 
changes in different items of the budget balance sheet may have very 
different effects on inflation (apart from their different effects on the real 
economy). 
Varvarigos (2010) constructs a stochastic, dynamic general equilibrium 
model of endogenously sustained growth of an economy whose 
government finances volatile public spending via seigniorage. The resulting 
volatility in money supply, combined with the effects of money on human 
capital formation, yielded some interesting and important results concerning 
macroeconomic performance. The model predicts a negative correlation 
between long-run output growth and policy volatility. In addition, given that 
both the mean and the variance of the inflation rate are elevated by volatility 
in public spending, the model provides a possible account for the strong 
positive correlation between inflation and its variability, as well as their 
negative correlation with output growth. 
 
3. – Data and methodology 
For the purpose of this paper, the variables analyzed have been expressed in 
a logarithmic form. The data that have been used are annual and cover the 
time period 1970-2009, for Mediterranean countries. 
The data used in this work were taken from the IMF Government and 
Finance Statistics database, which provide current and internationally 
comparable data on the finances and fiscal policies of Fund member 
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governments1. 
Most of time series have unit root as many studies indicated, including 
Nelson and Plosser (1982), and as proved by Stock and Watson (1988) and 
Campbell and Perron (1991) among others, that most of the time series are 
non-stationary. The presence of a unit root in any time series means that the 
mean and variance are not independent of time. Conventional regression 
techniques based on non-stationary time series produce spurious regression 
and statistics may simply indicate only correlated trends rather than a true 
relationship (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Spurious regression can be 
detected in regression model by low Durbin-Watson statistics and relatively 
moderate R2. 
One of the most widely used unit root test is the ADF unit root test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). Alternatively, Phillips (1987) and Phillips 
and Perron (1988) proposed a nonparametric method to correct a wide 
variety of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (PP). Perron (1989, 1990) 
demonstrates that if a time series exhibits stationary fluctuations around a 
trend or a level containing a structural break, then unit root tests will 
erroneously conclude that there is a unit root. PP and ADF tests have the 
same asymptotic distributions. 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (DF-GLS, 1996) proposed a modified 
Dickey-Fuller t test (known as the DF-GLS test). Essentially, the test is an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, except that the time series is transformed via 
a generalized least squares (GLS) regression before performing the test. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test involves fitting a regression of the form 
 
Δyt = α + βyt-1 + δt + ξ1Δyt-1 + ξ2Δyt-2 + … + ξkΔyt-k + εt [1] 
 
and then testing the null hypothesis H0: β=0. The DF-GLS test is 
performed analogously but on GLS-detrended data. The null hypothesis of 
the test is that yt is a random walk, possibly with drift. 
Finally, the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992) test 
differs from those unit root tests in common use (such as ADF, PP, and 
DF-GLS) by having a null hypothesis of stationarity. The test may be 
conducted under the null of either trend stationarity (the default) or level 
stationarity. Inference from this test is complementary to that derived from 
those based on the Dickey-Fuller distribution. 
Then we examine the unit root (or stationarity) properties of the 
variables, accounting for structural breaks. The present paper employs 
Zivot and Andrews (ZA, 1992) test to address this issue. The Zivot and 
Andrews test is performed by running the following regressions: 
 
xt = μ + βt + αxt-1 +   
 
    Δxt-i + εt [2] 
 
for t=1,…,T, where xt is a potentially non-stationary time-series, and the 
                                                 
1 See: http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/imf/gfs.asp. 
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terms Δxt-i, i=1,…,k are included to purge any serial correlation among 
residuals. 
Furthermore, Clemente, Montañés and Reyes (CMR, 1998) have 
developed a procedure allowing for a gradual shift in the mean to test more 
than one break point. 
The non-stationary series with the same order of integration may be 
cointegrated if there exist some linear combination of the series that can be 
tested for stationarity. The Johansen and Juselius procedure (Johansen, 
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990) is preferable to test for cointegration for 
more than two series. 
Moreover, Johansen and Juselius procedure is considered better than 
Engle-Granger even in two time series case and has better small sample 
properties since it allows feedback effects among the variables under 
investigation where it is assumed in the Engle and Granger procedure that 
there are no feedback effects between the variables. The procedure is based 
on likelihood ratio (LR) test to determine the number of cointegration 
vectors in the regression. Johansen technique enables to test for the 
existence of non-unique Cointegration relationships. 
Three tests statistics are suggested to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors: the first is Johansen’s “trace” statistic method, the 
second is his “maximum eigenvalue” statistic method, and the third method 
chooses r to minimize an information criterion. 
Having established the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
government expenditure and revenues, the short-run adjustments are 
estimated using the error correction model (ECM). The error correction 
model is based on the two following equations: 
 
ΔXt = α0 + α1et-1 +   
 
   αi ΔXt-i +  
 
   αj ΔYt-i + εt [3] 
ΔYt = β0 + β1ut-1 +  
 
   βi ΔYt-i +  
 
   βj ΔXt-i + ηt [4] 
 
where et-1 and ut-1 represent the error-correction terms which are the lagged 
residuals from the cointegration relations. The error correction terms will 
capture the speed of the short-run adjustments toward the long-run 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the error correction model equations (3) and (4) 
allow to test for short-run as well the long-run causality between 
government expenditure and aggregate income. 
The short-run causality is based on a standard F-test statistics to test 
jointly the significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variable in their 
first differences. The long-run causality is based on a standard t-test. 
Negative and statistically significant values of the coefficients of the error 
correction terms indicate the existence of long-run causality. 
 
4. – Econometric results 
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We present and discuss an empirical analysis of the nexus between public 
expenditure and inflation, applied to the Mediterranean countries. In Table 
1 variables of the model are summed up. All series contains yearly data in 
real terms. 
 
Table 1 – List of variables. 
Variable Explanation 
TEGG Total Expenditure of General Government, % of GDP 
NCPI National Consumer Price Index, 2000=100 
Source: IMF. 
 
In Figure 1 the first differences of NCPI (ΔNCPI) for the Mediterranean 
countries from 1970 to 2009 are shown. 
 
Figure 1 – Inflation in the Mediterranean countries (1970-2009). 
 
Source: our elaborations on IMF data. 
 
As a preliminary analysis, some descriptive statistics are shown in the 
following Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Exploratory data analysis (mld EIT, 1970-2009). 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
TEGG 45.2512 44.8566 5.5844 -0.2273 2.5783 26.6596 
NCPI 66.1517 71.2841 38.5341 -0.1515 1.7357 130.3617 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
Correlation coefficients summarized in Table 3 indicate a low positive 
correlation between real total public expenditure and price index. These 
findings indicate that higher values of real public expenditure are associated 
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with higher values of NCPI (except in Italy and Spain). 
 
Table 3 – Correlation between public expenditure and price index. 
Country Correlation coefficient between 
TEGG and NCPI 
Correlation coefficient between 
ΔTEGG and ΔNCPI 
Cyprus 0.9095 -0.0617 
France 0.8344 0.3088 
Greece 0.6284 -0.1408 
Italy 0.1241 0.3503 
Malta 0.5106 -0.0642 
Portugal 0.9422 -0.1384 
Spain -0.1412 -0.3202 
Notes: Bonferroni adjustment applied. 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
Above all, we obtained log-transformations of the time-series. As a 
preliminary analysis, Inter-Quartile Range show the absence of outliers in 
our samples. Then, we applied time-series techniques on stationarity and 
unit root processes, in order to check some stationarity properties. Table 4 
contains results of common unit root tests, for our variables. 
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Table 4 – Results for stationarity tests. 
Country Variable 
 
Stationarity tests 
 Deterministic 
component 
ADF ERS PP KPSS 
Cyprus TEGG intercept, trend NS: -2.357 NS: -2.336 NS: -2.357 TS: 0.113 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.887 NS: -1.217 NS: -2.871 NS: 0.357 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -3.418 DS: -2.298 DS: -3.418 DS: 0.067 
ΔNCPI intercept DS: -4.694 NS: -1.929 DS: -4.647 NS: 0.534 
France TEGG intercept, trend NS: -3.369 NS: -2.465 NS: -2.421 NS: 0.188 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.128 NS: -1.083 NS: -1.388 NS: 2.030 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -3.159 DS: -2.631 DS: -3.159 DS: 0.129 
ΔNCPI intercept NS: -1.942 NS: -1.412 DS: -1.923 NS: 0.433 
Greece TEGG intercept NS: -2.183 NS: -0.247 NS: -2.183 NS: 0.555 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.619 NS: -2.268 NS: -2.676 NS: 0.451 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -5.183 NS: -2.059 DS: -5.183 DS: 0.138 
ΔNCPI intercept NS: -1.610 NS: -1.092 NS: -1.579 NS: 1.140 
Italy TEGG intercept LS: -2.855 NS: -0.733 LS: -2.855 LS: 0.269 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.153 NS: -1.818 NS: -2.937 NS: 0.208 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -3.708 NS: -1.481 DS: -3.708 DS: 0.352 
ΔNCPI intercept NS: -2.622 NS: -1.373 NS: -2.567 NS: 0.676 
Malta TEGG intercept LS: -2.917 NS: -1.360 LS: -2.917 LS: 0.399 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.399 NS: -2.445 NS: -1.549 NS: 0.168 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -4.732 NS: -1.937 DS: -4.732 DS: 0.131 
ΔNCPI intercept DS: -3.715 DS: -2.703 DS: -3.725 DS: 0.143 
Portugal TEGG intercept, trend NS: -3.277 TS: -3.434 NS: -3.086 NS: 0.148 
NCPI intercept, trend NS: -2.120 NS: -2.125 NS: -2.972 NS: 0.309 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -4.125 DS: -2.783 DS: -4.098 DS: 0.064 
ΔNCPI intercept NS: -1.527 NS: -1.454 NS: -1.640 NS: 0.610 
Spain TEGG intercept NS: 0.720 NS: -1.389 NS: -1.218 LS: 0.232 
NCPI intercept, trend TS: -4.910 NS: -1.573 TS: -4.711 NS: 0.270 
ΔTEGG intercept DS: -3.222 DS: -2.321 DS: -3.299 DS: 0.458 
ΔNCPI intercept NS: -2.575 NS: -1.209 NS: -2.697 NS: 0.673 
Notes: LS: Level Stationary; NS: Non Stationary; TS: Trend Stationary; DS: Difference 
Stationary. 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
The second column presents results for Augmented Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) test; the third one for Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1992) test; the 
fourth column contains results for Phillips and Perron (1988) test; at last, in 
the fifth column there are results for Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin (1992) test. Here, results indicate that public expenditure is clearly a 
I(1) process in five countries (Cyprus, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain); 
a I(0) process for Italy and Malta (where it seems to be level-stationary). 
While, prices index is a I(2) process everywhere, except Malta (I(1)). 
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Table 5 – Results for unit root tests with structural breaks. 
Country Variable TB k t-stat 1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
Cyprus TEGG 2003 0 -4.573 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -5.504 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  0 -5.408 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  1 -6.428 -4.93 -4.42 
France TEGG 1992 1 -3.424 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -5.752 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  2 -3.918 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  0 -5.573 -4.93 -4.42 
Greece TEGG 2006 0 -3.663 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -7.309 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  0 -4.395 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  0 -5.601 -5.57 -5.08 
Italy TEGG 2005 0 -2.508 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -6.282 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  0 -4.679 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  0 -5.983 -4.93 -4.42 
Malta TEGG 2003 0 -5.230 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -5.324 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  0 -3.880 -4.93 -4.42 
Δ2NCPI  2 -4.892 -4.93 -4.42 
Portugal TEGG 1997 1 -4.512 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  1 -4.439 -4.93 -4.42 
ΔNCPI  0 -3.055 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  2 -4.835 -4.93 -4.42 
Spain TEGG 2007 0 -1.008 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔTEGG  0 -7.911 -5.57 -5.08 
ΔNCPI  1 -2.892 -5.57 -5.08 
Δ2NCPI  0 -6.047 -4.93 -4.42 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
The results of the Zivot and Andrews unit root test are summarized in 
Table 5. An examination of these results for public expenditure series 
indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected in levels 
(the only exception is Malta, at a 5% significance level). If we take the first 
differences, we can reject the null hypothesis for all countries, unless for 
Spain. So, we can conclude that public expenditure is clearly a I(1) process 
in six countries (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain); a I(0) 
process for Malta. Inflation is a I(1) process everywhere. 
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Table 6 – Results for additive outlier unit root tests. 
Country Variable SB k t-stat 5% Critical 
Value 
Cyprus TEGG 2000 0 -3.366 -3.560 
ΔTEGG  0 -6.378 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  4 -3.637 -3.560 
Δ2NCPI  1 -8.361 -3.560 
France TEGG 1994 1 -3.954 -3.560 
ΔTEGG  0 -3.964 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  5 -3.177 -5.490 
Δ2NCPI  1 -4.237 -3.560 
Greece TEGG 2008 0 -4.184 -3.560 
ΔTEGG  0 -6.796 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  5 -2.300 -5.490 
Δ2NCPI  0 -6.516 -5.490 
Italy TEGG 1989, 1996 4 -1.310 -5.490 
ΔTEGG  0 -5.559 -5.490 
ΔNCPI  2 -5.962 -5.490 
Δ2NCPI  2 -3.591 -3.560 
Malta TEGG 2000 2 -3.472 -3.560 
ΔTEGG  1 -3.891 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  0 -4.627 -5.490 
Δ2NCPI  1 -6.566 -3.560 
Portugal TEGG 1987, 1992 0 -2.330 -5.490 
ΔTEGG  1 -5.001 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  5 -3.127 -5.490 
Δ2NCPI  2 -3.892 -3.560 
Spain TEGG 1998, 2007 3 -3.646 -5.490 
ΔTEGG  1 -3.754 -3.560 
ΔNCPI  0 -4.205 -3.560 
Δ2NCPI  2 -3.658 -3.560 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
From the Table 6 above, we note that the Clemente at al. test results are 
quite different to those found with the Zivot and Andrews test. For TEGG, 
despite the structural break, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in five countries (Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain); as a 
conclusion, public expenditure seems to be a I(1) process in these countries, 
but a I(0) process in France and Greece. Inflation is I(0) for Cyprus, Italy 
and Spain, and I(1) otherwise. 
The lag-order selection has been chosen according to the final prediction 
error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information 
criterion (HQIC). 
Cointegration tests have been subsequently applied, in order to be able 
to find the long-run relationship between public expenditure variation 
(ΔTEGG) and inflation (ΔNCPI). As is shown in Table 7, Johansen and 
Juselius cointegration method suggests that there is one cointegrating 
relationship only in one case (Portugal). In fact, the trace statistic and the 
maximum-eigenvalue statistic reject r=0 in favour of r=1 at the 5% critical 
value only for this country. Yet, for Italy we have a contradictory result: in 
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fact, the trace statistic suggests r=1, while the maximum-eigenvalue statistic 
suggests r=0. As in the lag-length selection problem, choosing the number 
of cointegrating equations that minimizes either the SBIC or the HQIC 
provides a consistent estimator of the number of cointegrating equations. 
Yet, all these criteria suggest a rank=0 for our data. While, for Portugal we 
find the presence of cointegration (rank=1). 
 
Table 7 – Results for cointegration tests between public expenditure growth and 
inflation (ΔTEGG and ΔNCPI). 
Johansen and Juselius procedure 
Country Trace statistic Maximum-
eigenvalue 
statistic 
SBIC 
HQIC 
AIC 
Rank 
Cyprus 14.7664 
(19.96) 
8.3949 
(15.67) 
17.0911 
16.8696 
16.9294 
r=0 
France 13.4491 
(19.96) 
10.5467 
(15.67) 
14.2574 
14.1279 
14.0688 
r=0 
Greece 9.6624 
(19.96) 
8.2397 
(15.67) 
15.9234 
15.7583 
15.7246 
r=0 
Italy 20.1376 
(19.96) 
13.1048 
(15.67) 
14.3923 
14.2574 
14.2003 
r=0 
Malta 13.9444 
(19.96) 
8.6749 
(15.67) 
16.3768 
16.1553 
16.2152 
r=0 
Portugal 2.5511 
(9.42) 
2.5511 
(9.24) 
15.1416 
14.8875 
14.7679 
r=1 
Spain 10.0287 
(19.96) 
7.5472 
(15.67) 
14.8161 
14.5946 
14.6545 
r=0 
Notes: 5% Critical Values in parenthesis. 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
Granger causality tests suggest a bi-directional flow, at 1% significance 
level, for public expenditure growth and inflation in the Italian case, in the 
short-run; a unidirectional flow, in the direction from inflation to public 
expenditure for Portugal (in the long-run), and for France in the short-run 
(at 1% level); a unidirectional flow, but in the opposite direction (from 
public expenditure to inflation), for Cyprus (at 10% level), Malta (at 1% 
level) and Spain (at 5% level, see Table 8). 
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Table 8 – Results for short and long-run causality tests. 
Country Lags Log-
likelihood 
SBIC Causality in the 
long-run 
Causality in the 
short-run 
Cyprus 2 -84.4065 16.5527 - ΔG → ΔP 
France 1 -201.1204 14.3150 - ΔP → ΔG 
Greece 1 -148.5432 16.0526 - - 
Italy 2 -175.1035 14.4355 - ΔG → ΔP 
ΔP → ΔG 
Malta 2 -80.4865 15.8993 - ΔG → ΔP 
Portugal 1 -221.5129 15.1773 ΔP → ΔG - 
Spain 1 -82.4877 14.2689 - ΔG → ΔP 
Source: our calculations on IMF data. 
 
For all our equations, a Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation 
in the residuals of Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) clarifies as at 
the 5% significance level we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no serial correlation in the residuals for the orders 1,…,5 tested. Checking 
the eigenvalue stability condition in a VECM, the eigenvalues of the 
companion matrix lie inside the unit circle, and the real roots are far from 1. 
As regard the Wald lag-exclusion statistics, we strongly reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients either on the first lag or on the second lag of the 
endogenous variables are zero in all two equations jointly. The Jarque and 
Bera normality test results present statistics for each equation and for all 
equations jointly against the null hypothesis of normality. For our models, 
results suggest normality. Finally, the analysis of ARCH effects shows the 
absence of this problem for the estimated models. 
 
5. – Conclusions and policy implications 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the nexus 
between public expenditure and inflation, using recent econometric 
techniques. So, we studied the relationship between public expenditure and 
inflation for Mediterranean countries, using annual data covering the period 
1970-2009. The time-series properties of the data were assessed using 
several unit root tests (ADF, DF-GLS, PP, and KPSS). Furthermore, in 
order to evaluate the presence of eventual structural breaks, some tests (ZA 
and CMR) have been conducted. Empirical findings indicate that public 
expenditure is clearly a I(1) process in five countries (Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain); and a I(0) process for Italy and Malta. While, 
prices index is a I(2) process everywhere, except Malta. 
Cointegration analysis reveals that there is a long-run relationship 
between public expenditure/GDP growth and inflation only for Portugal. 
Moreover, Granger causality tests suggest a bi-directional flow, at 1% 
significance level, for public expenditure growth and inflation in the Italian 
case, in the short-run; a unidirectional flow, in the direction from inflation 
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to public expenditure for Portugal (in the long-run), and for France in the 
short-run (at 1% level); a unidirectional flow, but in the opposite direction 
(from public expenditure to inflation), for Cyprus (at 10% level), Malta (at 
1% level) and Spain (at 5% level). 
Yet, we find no clear evidence of government spending causing prices 
dynamics as far as the vice versa. In other words, the original Clark’s 
proposition of an excessive government spending as a cause of pressure on 
prices in the economy is not completely supported by the data for 
Mediterranean countries. Certainly, this result is subject to the time period 
examined and statistical methods used; nevertheless, our empirical findings 
don’t show a clear evidence in favour of the opposite direction of causality 
flow. In fact, inflation Granger-cause public expenditure growth in few 
cases. 
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